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Abstract
This paper provides an overview of the questions that will need to be addressed in order to
determine whether increased cyclicality in capital requirements will exacerbate the pro-cyclicality in
the financial system. Many central banks have raised concerns about the potential cost of pro-
cyclicality that could come with the Basel II framework, which will be implemented in the EU via the
Capital Requirements Directive (CRD). Previous capital adequacy rules required banks to hold a
minimum amount of capital for each loan, regardless of the different risks involved. The main
objective of the Basel II framework/CRD is to make capital requirements more risk-sensitive.
Therefore, by construction, the capital requirements under the CRD will be more cyclical than under
the previous rules. This raises two questions. First, does it matter whether regulatory capital
requirements fluctuate more than before if banks’ (lending) behaviour is driven by other capital
considerations (for example economic capital) ? Second, if it does matter, what impact will this have
on the economic cycle?
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Introduction
Pro-cyclicality in bank lending has traditionally been a concern for policy-makers
who try to maintain macro-economic and financial stability. By exacerbating the
business cycle, pro-cyclicality increases systemic risk. Pro-cyclicality could result in
a significant misallocation of resources if a significant number of negative net present
value loans are extended during an economic expansion and positive net present value
loans are denied during an economic downturn.
Recently, central banks
1 raised concerns regarding the potential costs of the additional
pro-cyclicality in lending that may come with the Basel II Framework, as
implemented in the EU via the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD). Previous
capital rules require banks to hold a minimum amount of capital for each loan largely
independent of the risk of this loan. The CRD has the objective of making capital
requirements more risk-sensitive. Therefore, by construction, the capital requirements
under the CRD will be more cyclical, i.e. co-moving with the cycle, than under the
previous rules. Banks in a bad economic environment that see their capital fall below
the minimum required may decide to cut back on their lending activity. Vice versa, an
economic upturn may lead to some excess in capital within banks which may induce
banks to increase lending. Consequently, the use of risk sensitive capital requirements
may be reflected into more pro-cyclical lending behaviour, which may exacerbate the
economic cycle. To closely monitor this, article 156 of the CRD has mandated the
European Commission and the ECB to analyse the impact of the CRD on the
economic cycle.
This paper provides an overview of the questions that will need to be addressed in
order to monitor the possible pro-cyclicality that may result from the Basel II
Framework / the CRD.
The first section of this paper discusses how the CRD can be a possible source of pro-
cyclicality. Inherent to the design of the CRD, minimum regulatory capital
requirements will fluctuate more than the present capital requirements (“Basel I”).
This observation raises 2 questions. First, does it matter whether the required capital
fluctuates more than before given that banks’ lending behaviour is often driven by
other capital considerations? In other words, is capital regulation binding? This
question is addressed in section 2. Second, if it does matter, what will be the
consequences on the economic cycle? In other words, will this capital constraint lead
to an amplification of the macroeconomic cycle? This issue is addressed in section 3.
On the basis of this conceptual framework, section 4 launches some questions one
needs to address in order to monitor CRD pro-cyclicality.
1   See for example the following non-complete list of published papers by several central banks: by
the Bank of England: Nier and Zicchino, FSR, December 2005; by the Deutsche Bundesbank: Stolz
and Wedow, Deutsche Bundesbank WP 2005, by Banco de Espana: Nota in Estabilidad Financiera,
05/2005 no.8; by the Sveriges Riksbank:  F S R  2 0 0 4  n o . 1 ,  b y  t h e  B a n k  o f  F i n l a n d :  P e u r a  a n d
Jokivuolle 2004; by the Oesterreichische Nationalbank: Redak and Tscherteu FSR 2003 no. 5; by
the ECB: Monthly Bulletin May 2001, by De Nederlandsche Bank: Bikker and Hu, Research Series
Supervision 2001 no.39; …2
1. CRD capital requirements as an (additional) possible source of pro-cyclicality.
1.1 Different sources of pro-cyclicality
Pro-cyclicality in lending and borrowing behaviour may have several sources, which
are very often endogenous to financial systems. In practice, and in particular in stress
circumstances, it may be hard to identify the source of the observed pro-cyclicality.
Very often, these sources jointly contribute to the pro-cyclicality in lending.
First, fluctuations in the business cycle may be linked to fluctuations in the quality of
banks’ and borrowers’ balance sheets. An increase in bank profits during upturns
may support the extension of credit while a decrease in bank profits during downturns
may dampen the extension of credit. An economic downturn may confront firms with
declining profits and may decrease the demand for new credit.
A second related explanation for pro-cyclicality in the financial system has its roots in
information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. When economic conditions
are depressed and collateral values are low, information asymmetries can mean that
even borrowers with profitable projects find it difficult to obtain funding. When
economic conditions improve and collateral values rise, the opposite situation may
occur. This reasoning suggests that cyclical effects may be more pertinent for
borrowers which are more prone to asymmetric information effects (such as SMEs).
Third, others (see e.g. Borio et al.) have argued that pro-cyclicality in lending may
stem from inappropriate responses by financial system participants and that bank
lending behaviour can be explained using theories of behavioural finance. Bank
lending behaviour may be based either on euphoric expectations associated with an
investment boom driven by the business cycle (Minsky, 1977) or on disaster myopia
where the subjective probability of a major shock decreases as time elapses since the
last shock (Guttentag and Herring, 1984). Consistent with the latter is the institutional
memory hypothesis developed by Berger and Udell (2003) where the capacity of loan
officers to evaluate risk and identify potential future problems deteriorates as time
passes since the last period during which they experienced large credit losses.
Therefore, lending standards soften as time passes since the last period when a bank
experienced problem loans. Lending standards are then tightened again when large
losses are experienced.
Fourth, it is unclear whether new financial innovative instruments are a possible
additional source of pro-cyclicality. The use of these instruments facilitated the
spreading and the diversification of credit risks and increased the possibilities of
hedging. In favourable circumstances, banks can easily transfer credit risk using
innovative credit risk transfer (CRT) products
2. This may induce banks to increase
lending as credit risk
3 can be transferred.
The pro-cyclical effects of these instruments in an economic downturn will depend
very much on how well these new CRT markets function in distressed circumstances.
2  For example, single name (for example credit default swaps - CDS) or multi name (un)structured
products (for example collateralised debt obligations – CDO).
3 In what follows, the terms credit risk and default risk are used interchangeable. Some instruments,
for example a CDS, only transfer the default risk.3
Pro-cyclical effects may be dampened if these markets continue to function well.
Credit to borrowers whose risk has increased in the downturn of the credit cycle may
be sold. However, pro-cyclical effects may be reinforced when these markets function
less effectively in stressed circumstances. Existing asymmetric problems between
lenders and protection sellers/investors
4 may become more pertinent. Therefore, risks
on the balance sheet of banks
5 may become harder to sell in the CRT markets.
Moreover, risks that were sold may materialise when counterparties are unable to
provide protection when an event occurs (for example due to the default of the
counterparty). This may lead banks to refrain from granting credit, which may further
amplify the stress situation.
To our knowledge, there is no literature on this topic
6. However, the reasoning above
suggests that new financial instruments may have an impact on the credit cycle. It is
rather unclear whether they make them more or less pronounced in bad economic
conditions.
Fifth, regulation may also come at the potential cost of greater pro-cyclicality.
Capital requirements
7, for example, may further force banks to reduce lending in an
economic downturn and stimulate increased lending in an economic upswing. Banks
in a bad economic environment that see their actual capital fall below the minimum
required may decide to tighten lending standards and to cut back on their lending
activity, thus contributing to a worsening of the initial downturn. Vice versa, an
economic upturn may lead to some excess in economic capital within banks. This
may induce banks to soften lending standards and to increase lending, thereby
providing a further stimulus to the increase in the macroeconomic cycle. The next
section discusses how some of the specific features of the CRD (compared to present
capital regulation) may increase pro-cyclicality concerns.
1.2 CRD cyclicality
Present capital rules require banks to hold a minimum amount of capital for each loan
largely independent of the risk of this loan. The CRD has the objective of making
capital requirements more risk-sensitive. Banks should therefore hold more capital for
more risky credit exposures and less capital for less risky credit exposures. The CRD
contains two different approaches to determine capital risk-weights: the external
ratings-based approach (or standardised approach, SA) and the internal rating-based
approach (IRB). These risk-weights need to be multiplied by the “exposure at
default” (EAD) to obtain the risk-weighted exposures
8. Capital requirements can be
derived by dividing the risk-weights by 12.5.
4  See  Kiff  et  al.  (2003),  Mitchell  (2005),  CGFS  (2005) and  Masschelein  and Praet  (2001) for an
overview of existing asymmetric information problems between lenders and protection
sellers/investors in CRT markets.
5 Linnel and Merritt (2004) have shown some anecdotal evidence that even for liquid names, market
volumes can dry up very quickly in stress events.
6   Only some very general discussion has been provided in Rajan (2005).
7  In what follows, we ignore possible pro-cyclicality effects at work through asset revaluation
reserves that under certain conditions can be included in Tier 2 capital.
8   For loans, this EAD is the book value. For credit lines, the EAD under the IRB approach reflects
the bank’s estimate of likely drawdown prior to default.4
The SA differs from Basel I essentially in making the capital requirements dependent
on external ratings. Banks continue, however, to be allowed to take account of several
credit risk mitigating techniques, such as collateral, guarantees, credit derivatives and
netting agreements. The SA does not allow banks to use their own data and estimates
for calculating capital requirements for lending secured by mortgages on residential
property and on commercial real estate. The “broad-brush” treatment provided for by
the SA implies that lending that is fully secured by mortgages on residential property
will (under certain circumstances) be risk weighted at 35%. Lending fully secured by
commercial real estate will be risk weighted at 100%
9.
In the IRB, banks are allowed to use their own ratings in determining the risk weights
to exposures. The weights exhibit a much higher risk-sensitivity than the ones under
the SA. An IRB supervisory formula transforms risk components (probability of
default or PD, loss given default or LGD, and effective maturity or M) into risk-
weights, which then need to be multiplied by the EAD.
For corporate exposures, there is a distinction between a foundation and an advanced
approach. In the IRB foundation approach (FIRB) banks need to internally calculate
PD. LGDs for unsecured exposures are set by the CRD. This supervisory LGD can be
adjusted when exposures are collateralised. The calculation of the EAD and M are
also determined by the CRD. Under the advanced approach (AIRB), banks must
provide their own estimates of PD, LGD, M and EAD. In both the FIRB and the
AIRB and under certain conditions, residential and commercial real estate is accepted
as collateral in order to calculate the LGD
10. For retail exposures, only the AIRB
approach is available; hence, banks must provide their own estimates of PD, LGD
and EAD.
It is expected that the risk-weights in the different approaches are correlated with the
macro-economic conditions. We make the following 3 conjectures.
1. The risk-weights in all three approaches (SA, FIRB and AIRB) are expected
to be responsive to macro-economic conditions. Borrowers may be
downgraded in a recession, which may require banks to meet additional
capital requirements and induce them to tighten lending standards. Borrowers
may be upgraded in a boom, which may result in some freeing of capital and
stimulate banks to increase lending. We therefore expect the minimum capital
requirements to fall as the economy enters into an expansion and to increase
as it enters into a recession.
2. The IRB risk-weights are expected to be more responsive than the SA risk-
weights. The degree of the cyclicality will very much depend on the
characteristics of the PD rating system (point-in-time (PIT) or through-the-
cycle (TTC)). External ratings are typically viewed as more through-the-cycle
than internal ratings and therefore likely to be less cyclical than IRB risk-
weights. Furthermore, the IRB approach also allows banks to use residential
and commercial real estate collateral to adjust the supervisory LGDs, which
are more responsive to economic conditions than other types of collateral.
9   Exposures secured by mortgages on commercial real estate are allowed to be weighted at 50%,
subject to the discretion of the competent authorities and at certain conditions.
10   This collateral will need to be valued at or less than the fair value.5
3. The AIRB risk-weighted exposures for corporates are expected to be more
responsive to the business cycle than the FIRB risk-weighted exposures for
corporates. In the AIRB approach, banks must provide their own estimates of
LGD and EAD. Internally estimated LGD and EAD are seen as more
responsive to the business cycles than the supervisory LGD and EAD.
It is not clear whether the capital requirements that banks need to hold for exposures
which are hedged using new CRT instruments, contribute to cyclicality. Minimum
capital requirements differ for single name products and multi name products
products (see also Basel (2004, 2005) and Joint Forum, 2005)). In the box below, a
simple example is presented, to illustrate how pro-cyclicality can occur in the case
where a bank uses single name products, but examples can also be given for multi-
name products.
Box 1: Possible effects of capital requirements for CDS products on cyclicality
By using a simple example this box illustrates how both the CRD capital
requirements and the use of CRT products may  affect the cycle.
Suppose that time t represents a period in which macro-economic conditions are
normal. Time t+1 represents an expected period of distress. We assume that all loans
are homogenous at time t and that they all require a risk-weight of 100%. All loans
are equally affected by the worsened macro-economic conditions at time t+1.
Therefore, at time t+1 they all require a risk-weight of 150%.
If the bank decides to buy credit protection for this loan via a CDS, the bank can
replace the risk-weight of the underlying loan (reference entity) by that of the
protection seller (at least if the necessary supervisory criteria are fulfilled). Suppose
that the bank buys protection of an AA-rated bank. Hence, the bank will be able to
substitute its corporate risk-weight charge for the one applied to the bank. Let us
assume this is 20%, which is the risk-weight for an AA-rated bank in the standardised
approach.
11.
We consider 3 cases (see also table below). In the first case, the bank grants a loan at
time t and sells the related credit risk immediately via the CDS market. This allows
the bank to replace the 100% risk-weight by the 20%. This risk-weight remains
independent of the functioning of the CDS market at time t+1 (i.e. whether the credit
risk can be sold or not in the CDS market). The lower capital requirements that banks
need to hold, may induce banks to increase their lending in good times. These
decisions, when taken simultaneously by many banks for many exposures, may have
an impact on the credit cycle.
In the second case, the bank grants a loan at time t and decides to sell it at time t+1
(possibly due to the increase in the risk-weight). Again the bank can replace the 150%
11  We assume here that this risk-weight already takes into account the double-default adjustment,
which recognises the additional benefits obtained from the presence of credit protection, i.e. both
the underlying exposure and the protection provider must default for a loss to be incurred. See
BCBS (2005) for more information on this adjustment.6
risk-weight by the 20%. If credit risk is accurately priced then the bank will need to
pay a higher CDS premium to the protection seller. If the loan has been granted at a
fixed rate at time t, it may not be possible for the bank to pass the premium on to the
borrower. The additional cost of the CDS premium may affect banks’ profitability
and may thus induce banks to reduce loan exposure. In a badly functioning CDS
market, the bank is not able to sell the credit risk because there is no counterparty in
the CDS market willing to take on this risk. The bank will then need to bear the
additional capital cost for this corporate loan and may decided to lower its loan
exposure. It is only in a situation where the increase in the required capital in a badly
functioning CDS market is different from the decrease in required capital and
increase in CDS premium in a good functioning CDS market that one expects a
different effect on banks' loan exposure.
In the third case, the bank wants to grant a loan at t+1 to a firm whose credit risk has
increased between time t and time t+1 due to the macroeconomic developments. If the
credit risk can be sold in the CDS market, it is likely that part of the higher CDS
premium will be passed on to the borrower, which in turn may have a negative effect
on the loan volume the firm wants to borrow. If the credit risk cannot be sold in the
CDS market and the bank anticipates this, then the higher capital cost can be (at least
partially) passed on to the borrower, which may have an impact on the size of loan.
Again it is only in a situation where the increase in the required capital in a badly
functioning CDS market is different from the decrease in required capital and
increase in CDS premium in a good functioning CDS market that one expects a
different effect on banks' loan exposure.
Considerations related interactions CRD capital requirements and CRT products
Well-functioning CDS market Badly-functioning CDS market
Impact t t+1 t t+1
RW RW=100ĺ20 RW=20 RW=100ĺ20 RW=20 CASE 1
Loan (*) Ĺ loans Ĺ loans
RW RW=100 RW=20






Loan (*) = loans ? loans = loans Ļ loans
RW RW=150ĺ20








Loan (*) ? loans Ļ loans
Case 1: Loan granted at time t, credit risk sold via CDS market at time t
Case 2: Loan granted at time t, credit risk sold via CDS market at time t+1
Case 3: Loan granted at time t+1, credit risk sold via CDS market at time t+1
(*) Under the condition that regulatory capital is binding
This simple example has illustrated that the combined effect of applying capital
requirements and using CDS for hedging purposes on cyclicality is not unambiguous.
This example could be extended to take account of the following considerations.
1/ Typically, banks do not only use these CRT products to hedge risks but also to take
on risks. This may have an effect on banks’ total riskiness.7
2/ No assumptions are made about the quality of the new loans when banks increase
their lending or about the quality of loans that banks dispose of / or the loans that
they reject when they want to decrease their lending. This may affect the overall
quality of the loan portfolio and thus banks’ total riskiness.
3/  It is implicitly assumed that market participants do not anticipate the stress event.
4/ Furthermore, worsening macro-economic conditions may affect the rating (and
thus the risk-weight) of the counterparty.
1.3 Mitigators to cyclicality in the CRD
Some of the pro-cyclicality concerns have been partially met in the design of the
capital framework. In the IRB approach, banks are encouraged to base their Pillar 1
calculation of required capital on a so-called “through-the-cycle (TTC)” estimate of
PD, a so-called “down-turn” LGD and a “down-turn” EAD. PDs need to be derived
from a two-stage process. In the first stage, a bank must assign to each of its obligors
a rating grade. Basel II suggests a preference for a TTC rating grade (in contrast to a
more point-in-time rating grade). In the second stage, banks need to calculate a PD
for each grade, and this PD is assigned to each obligor in a given grade. These PDs
need to be a long-run average of the one-year default rates (see box 2 for an
illustration). LGDs and EADs need to be calculated at the facility-level and need to
reflect economic downturn conditions. The LGDs cannot be less than the long-run
default-weighted average loss rate given default. EADs must be an estimate of the
long-run default-weighted average EADs.
Secondly, at the purely mechanical level, the concavity of the IRB supervisory curve
with respect to PD reduces the sensitivity of requirements capital to downgrades
compared to the SA. The concavity of the IRB curves implies that capital
requirements for higher quality portfolios are more sensitive to volatility in borrower
PDs than is capital on lower quality portfolios. For some asset classes this effect has
been strengthened by the way the asset correlation formula has been specified,
namely as a decreasing function of PD. The effect of the concavity of the curve is to
dampen the cyclicality of the IRB capital requirements. Also at the mechanical level,
the maturity adjustment in the AIRB, which has been specified as a decreasing
function of PD, reduces the sensitivity of capital downgrades compared to the FIRB
approach (see box 2 for a concrete example).
Box 2: Illustrations of mitigators to cyclicality in the CRD.
This box illustrates some of the mechanisms that have been introduced in the CRD to
mitigate cyclicality. First, the impact of using TTC PD rating grades versus PIT PD
rating grades on capital requirements. Second, the maturity adjustment in the AIRB,
which has been specified as a decreasing function PD.
First, the degree to which capital requirements fluctuate depends on whether a PIT or
a TTC rating system is used. Point-in-time rating systems use all available obligor-
specific and aggregate information to measure the PD of the rating buckets. A TTC
rating system uses all available obligor characteristics, but tends not to adjust ratings8
in response to changes in macroeconomic conditions. In practice, however, rating
systems tend to exhibit characteristics of both TTC and PIT rating philosophies.
In order to illustrate the impact of the rating system on capital, a PIT and a TTC
rating system is developed by using the same dataset and the same methodology as in
Marcelo and Scheicher (2005). The PIT rating system is developed using the
Moody’s KMV EDF database on European firms. These “expected default
frequencies” or EDFs are measured in a Merton-type model using information on the
equity price of the firm and information on the firm’s liabilities. These firms are then
grouped into 10 risk categories; the average EDF of the firms in each group is then
used to estimate the PD. The TTC rating system has been created by using the same
dataset. In order to (partially) eliminate macroeconomic influences, the firms were
first ordered in terms of their relative difference in EDF from the average sector
EDFs. These firms were then allocated to a rating grade using a symmetric
distribution. The average EDF of the group was then used to estimate the PD.
12
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Figure 1 clearly shows the dampening effect on capital requirements of using a TTC
rating system compared to a PIT rating system. The volatility in the capital
requirements, measured as the standard deviation relative to the mean, is 0.09 when a
TTC rating system is used and 0.22 for a PIT rating system.
Second, at the purely mechanical level, the IRB supervisory risk-weight curve
includes some technicalities that dampen the cyclicality (see also Gordy and Howells
(2006)). One example is the maturity adjustment in the AIRB, which has been
specified as a decreasing function in PD, and which reduces the sensitivity of capital
to a downgrade.
For example, a three-year loan to a borrower which has been classified in grade 3 in
the PIT rating system discussed above has a PD of 0.27%. If this borrower is
12  The general idea of this technique is in line with the one used in Gordy and Howells (2006).  More
detailed information can be found in Scheicher and Marcelo. Other papers often use data provided
by rating agencies to create a TTC rating system.9
downgraded after one year to a grade in which the PD is 0.54% (which is an increase
in PD of 100%) then the capital requirements under the AIRB approach increases by
17% (k(PD=0.54%, M=2)/k(PD=0.27%, M=3)) while the increase under the FIRB
approach is 14% (k(PD=0.54%, M= 2.5)/k(PD=0.27%, M=2.5)). The corresponding
increases for a three-year loan of grade 7 with a PD of 3.7%, which sees its PD
increase by 100% are 17% under the AIRB approach and 26% under the FIRB
approach. This example clearly shows that there is a larger relative effect of maturity
at lower PD levels. This implies that pro-cyclicality under the AIRB will be
dampened by the maturity adjustment.
Further, in assessing capital adequacy under Pillar 2, the supervisor is required to be
mindful of the particular stage of the business cycle in which the bank is operating. In
addition, banks need to conduct rigorous, forward-looking stress tests that identify
possible events or changes in market conditions that could have an advert impact.
The CRD may also stimulate more forward-looking behaviour by banks. As they will
now dispose of a better metric for measuring credit risk, this may result in a more
structured decision-making process. It could prevent banks from exhibiting irrational
exuberance during an expansion and being suddenly confronted with a drop in capital
adequacy triggering a credit crunch.
13 The CRD may encourage banks, especially
those under the IRB, to recognise capital insufficiencies earlier in a credit cycle.
1.4 Empirical literature on the cyclicality of CRD
Several studies have analysed the potential cyclical effects of the new capital
requirements. A large stream of studies (see e.g. Kashyap and Stein (2003) and
Marcelo and Scheicher (2005) for a detailed overview of this literature) uses the IRB
foundation formulas in order to analyse the relationship between the credit quality of
corporate borrowers (PD) and the capital charges. Other input factors (such as LGD
and EAD) are typically assumed to be constant.
The analysis is done by mechanically plotting different PDs in the IRB risk-weight
curves. The PDs are calculated in good and bad macroeconomic periods, and using
point-in-time and through-the-cycle approaches. Some authors have stressed the
many methodological differences between different studies (sample differences,
survivorship bias, handling of default borrowers, portfolio management assumptions,
etc.).
14
Despite these differences, the main findings of these studies can be summarised as
follows:
x Ratings typically worsen in an economic downturn and improve in an
economic expansion, which translates into a significant cyclical behaviour of
the regulatory requirements. For example, Gordy and Howells (2006) find that
13  For example, Basel I gave banks incentives to reduce regulatory capital requirements by shedding
high-quality assets from their books. One popular way of doing this is to securitize them, with the
originating banks often holding on to the riskiest first loss positions to help support the deal.
14  See Kashyap and Stein (2003); Gordy and Howells (2006) and Marcelo and Scheicher (2005) for
an overview.10
the new approach could lead to volatility in the capital charge
15 (relative to the
mean) of 0.1 to 0.26 (depending on the simulation technology).
x In some cases the capital requirement on the non-defaulting portfolio can
decrease in an economic downturn  By sweeping away the weakest borrowers,
a stress event can paradoxically improve the average credit quality in a
portfolio. (Catarineu-Rabell et al. 2003).
x The volatility of capital charges is higher for better quality credits as such
credits have the potential of further migrating down the rating scale and face a
steeper risk curve.
x The impact seems to be larger when a point-in-time rating system is used
compared to a through-the-cycle rating system.
This literature has its merits in measuring the sensitivity of Pillar I regulatory capital
requirements when using different types of rating systems in different time periods.
However, these studies ignore some important issues.
First, all the studies focus on FIRB banks ignoring the possible cyclical effects that
can come from time-varying LGDs and EADs. Literature on whether there is a
relationship between the business cycles and the LGDs is not clear cut. Whereas
Asarnow and Edwards (1995), Altman and Brady (2002) and Dermine and Neto de
Carvalho (2006) observe only a weak or no dependence of LGDs on macroeconomic
variables, the work by Gupton et al. (2000), Frye (2003) and Düllmann and Trapp
(2004) suggests that LGDs are more closely linked to the business cycle. A recent
study by Jiménez et al. (2006) has shown that EAD also exhibits cyclical
characteristics. Using data on Spanish credit lines they found that during recessions,
credit line usage increases, in particular among the more fragile borrowers. Also
Asarnow and Marker (1995) have shown  that the size of the drawn portion of loan
commitments is closely related to the credit quality of the obligor.
Second, the studies do not address the possible (anti)cyclical effects that could come
from the new CRT markets. To the best of our knowledge, no research has been
conducted in this area. There is also very limited data available on CRT products.
Therefore, there is no information on whether this is an important factor and if so,
under which conditions.
Third, all studies that analyse the impact of Basel II on pro-cyclicality limit the
discussion to Pillar I. Capital required under Pillar II is hard to quantify and is
therefore always ignored. However, Pillar II may moderate or amplify capital
cyclicality, thus it may be worthwhile to extend the pro-cyclicality discussion also to
Pillar II.
Fourth, the analysis is typically performed on a (small) subset of (hypothetical) bank
portfolios i.e. corporate portfolios. Cyclicality of the regulatory capital requirements
for other asset classes (retail, mortgages, SMEs, banks, sovereign etc.) is typically not
addressed.
15  To estimate the volatility, the authors first calculated for each bank the standard deviation across
time of the capital charges. Volatility is then the mean across banks of this standard deviation.11
Finally, the empirical part of the literature ignores the fact that capital requirements
may not be binding. Often the argument is made that it does not matter that new
capital requirements fluctuate more than before given that banks’ behaviour is driven
by other capital considerations.
1.5 Summary
Pro-cyclicality may have different sources. An analysis aimed at determining the
extent to which cyclical lending behaviour depends upon capital requirements
requires a good understanding of the different other possible sources of pro-
cyclicality and of the developments in the financial sector which may influence the
importance of these sources over time. An empirical exercise intended to analyse the
cyclicality that comes from regulatory capital requirements needs to control for these
other potential sources.
The CRD has the objective of making capital requirements more risk-sensitive. By
construction, the capital requirements under the new regime will be more cyclical
than under Basel I. In order to dampen these effects several mitigators have been built
in. This raises the question as to whether it matters that required capital fluctuates
more than before, given that banks’ behaviour is driven by other capital
considerations.
2. Are banks constrained by the CRD capital requirements?
16
A necessary condition for regulatory capital requirements to have a pro-cyclical effect
is that they are binding, at least at the downturn of the business cycle. Capital
requirements, however, may not be binding when banks’ shareholders and other
counterparties require a higher level of capital.
Banks distinguish between regulatory capital, economic capital, rating agencies’
capital and actual capital. Regulatory capital is defined as the minimum capital
required by regulators. Economic capital can be defined as the amount of capital that
the banks’ shareholders would target in the absence of any regulation or other
constraint. Rating agency capital can be defined as the capital that is required by
rating agencies in order for the bank to obtain a given rating. The actual capital the
bank holds is defined as the capital chosen by banks’ counterparties taking into
account these market and regulatory constraints. In determining the level of capital,
regulators, investors, counterparties take into account the trade-off between the cost
of funding the bank with expensive capital against the benefit of decreasing the
probability of reducing its franchise value (which is reducing the probability of bank
failure).
Banks often statistically estimate their economic capital as the capital a bank needs to
hold in order to cover the potential loss calculated over 1 year at a pre-specified
16   I like to thank Janet Mitchell for discussions on this section.12
confidence level. Banks typically use the latter for pricing purposes. Similar to the
way banks estimate their economic capital, the CRD regulatory capital has been set so
that it covers the loss over 1 year calculated at a certain confidence level (see box 3
for a general comparison between the CRD capital and economic capital models).
Box 3: Possible differences regulatory capital and economic capital model.
The objective of the IRB risk-weight functions is better alignment of the regulatory
capital requirements with economic capital requirements. Similar to the definition of
economic capital, regulatory capital in the CRD has been defined as the capital that is
set by regulatory authorities so that it covers the loss over one year calculated at a
certain confidence level.
In principle, the IRB risk-weight functions are based on the same risk measurement
concepts as the economic capital models used by banks internally
17
.  If economic and
regulatory capital requirements are modelled in the same way and are driven by the
same input factors, one should expect that events have the same impact on economic
and regulatory capital requirements. In practice, however, there seem to be many
differences between the input factors and the applied modelling techniques.
Therefore, economic capital and regulatory capital requirements do not necessarily
move together over time.
Input factors
Bank shareholders mostly require banks to hold a level of economic capital which
differs from the level of regulatory capital in that they target a higher solvency
standard. Large international banks employ a solvency standard which is higher than
the 99.9% probability implicitly set forward in the CRD. Evidence for this can be
found in academic literature (see e.g. Jackson et al (2001)) and in individual banks’
annual reports. Deutsche bank (2004) and ING Groep NV (2004), for example,
mention in their annual reports that economic capital is set at a solvency level of
99.98% and 99.95% respectively.
Modelling techniques
The IRB risk-weight functions are based on a single-factor model which does not
account for differences in diversification. Economic capital models, however,
typically take into account diversification benefits, both within and across risk types.
A credit portfolio, for example, can produce diversification gains by investing in a
variety of sectors and countries. Furthermore, the aggregation of different risk types
enables to capture the diversification benefits between the different risk types.
To give an example, the CRD does not allow for an integrated modelling of credit and
market risk to calculate capital requirements. It requires banks to calculate capital
requirements for market and credit risk separately, which then need to be summed
arithmetically
18. Economic capital models, however, may take into account time-
17   See Gordy (2003) for credit risk
18  This implicitly assumes perfect correlation between credit and market risk.13
varying correlation between credit and market risk. The attendance of an external
shock that greatly magnifies the correlation between credit and market risk (and
keeping all other variables constant), may lead to an increase in economic capital but
not to an increase in regulatory capital.
It is very often argued that regulatory capital requirements are not binding as long as
banks hold positive capital buffers, which is defined as the difference between actual
capital and regulatory capital. However, a bank may use its regulatory capital
requirements as a starting point to determine its actual capital by adding for example
a % mark-up. In this case one could not with certainty say that the regulatory capital
requirements are not binding. It is thus not possible to see whether regulatory capital
is binding by only comparing regulatory and actual capital without any knowledge
about how banks choose their actual capital holdings.
Literature points out several reasons why banks may want to hold positive capital
buffers. One argument is that it is not only costly to hold capital but it is also costly to
raise capital in response to unexpected changes in market conditions. Apart from the
pure transaction costs, other adjustment costs relate to the problem of asymmetric
information in capital markets (as the issuer has an informational advantage over the
potential buyer).
This reasoning would imply that firms may wish to increase capital when conditions
are favourable for periods when conditions for raising extra capital are not ideal (e.g.
in a downturn). In order to avoid breaches of the regulatory capital requirements,
banks thus may want to build up capital buffers during upturns, which might be used
to fulfil a likely increase in requirements in a downturn. This behaviour would
reduce, but may not fully eliminate, possible pro-cyclical effects. Numerical analysis
in Peura and Jokivuolle (2004) suggests that the introduction of the risk sensitive
capital requirements may even necessitate higher bank capital buffers because of the
increased volatility of the minimum capital requirements.
Empirical analysis on the Basel I regime, however, suggests that banks’ capital
buffers do not serve as a mitigator of cyclicality of the present capital requirements.
Ayuso et al (2004) and Stolz and Wedow (2005) for example found a negative effect
of the business cycle (GDP) on the regulatory capital buffers of Spanish and German
banks respectively. Capital buffers decrease when economic conditions improve,
while capital buffers increase when economic conditions worsen. One possible
explanation of the latter result is the short-sightedness of banks. Banks expand their
loan portfolios in an economic upturn without building up their capital buffers to the
same extent. Another possible reason is that firms may be inclined to ask more credit
in an economic upturn and less credit in an economic downturn.
As rightfully pointed out by Repullo and Suarez (2007) one has to be very careful in
using results obtained in the Basel I regime to predict behaviour in the Basel II world.
Buffers are likely to be endogenously affected by the characteristics of capital
regulation. Therefore the analysis on capital buffers may not be immune to the Lucas
critique.14
It is unclear how the implementation of the CRD will affect the size of the capital
buffers. The QIS5 results (see box 4 for a summary) suggest that the minimum
regulatory requirements under the CRD will decrease relative to the current
regulatory framework. Assuming that the CRD does not affect banks capital holding,
this implies that under the favourable QIS5 macroeconomic conditions during which
the QIS5 was undertaken, it is more likely that a larger number of banks have binding
larger capital buffers (compared to the previous framework). A bank that sees its
capital fall in good times relative to the capital of the previous regime may be induced
to increase its lending; it may decrease its lending in bad times when it sees its capital
rise  relative to current previous capital requirements.
In order to analyse the question whether the CRD capital requirement constraints will
be binding requires a good understanding of how actual capital is set and how the
different categories of capital, rating agencies', the regulatory and the economic
capital relate to each other.
Box 4: Likely impact of the CRD on capital requirements (QIS5)
The main objective of the Quantitative Impact Studies (QIS) is to allow the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision to evaluate the potential changes in minimum
required capital levels under Basel II. This box summarises the main results of the
QIS5 exercise for the CEBS countries (see BCBS (2006) for the full report). These
countries are either EU member states, EU accession candidates or members of the
European Economic Area.
1. The QIS5 results show a decrease in minimum required capital relative to current
requirements. CEBS Group 1
19 banks see, on average, a decrease in their minimum
required capital of 0.9%, 3.2% and 8.3% for the standardised, foundation and
advanced IRB approaches respectively. CEBS Group 2 banks demonstrate decreases
of 3.0%, 16.6% and 26.6%. Focussing on the most likely approach, the results show
an average decrease of 7.7% for CEBS Group 1 banks and of 15.4% for CEBS Group
2 banks.
2. Macro-economic conditions prevailing in most countries at the time of the QIS5
were more benign than during e.g. QIS3. A comparison of the results from QIS5 and
QIS3 is, however, difficult (e.g. due to differences in calculation rules, data quality,
etc.). The Basel Committee reported that currently available information does not
allow the impact of the macro-economic conditions to be quantified with precision.
Summary
One necessary condition for regulatory capital requirements to have a pro-cyclical
effect is that they are binding. If regulatory capital requirements, however, are not
19  Group 1 banks are banks which fulfil the following three criteria: the bank has a Tier 1 capital in
excess on €3 billion; the bank is diversified; and the bank is internationally active. Group 2 consists
of banks that do not meet these criteria.15
the binding constraint, then any action to reduce the co-movements of the CRD
requirements with the economic cycle will have no effect on banks’ lending
behaviour.
3. Does the capital constraint lead to an amplification of the macro-economic cycle?
If a bank is constrained by its capital position, it can react in three ways: (1) by
raising new capital, the numerator; (2) by decreasing its overall credit exposure; or (3)
by shifting the composition of exposures toward those with a lower risk weight and
away from those with a higher risk weight (possibly using credit risk transfer
instruments). Banks will choose the option or the combination of options that entails
the lowest cost. Banks may prefer e.g. to limit the amount of credit granted or may
prefer to set interest rates at a level at which the higher capital cost is reflected into
the interest rate. These actions may contribute to a worsening of the downturn.
Alternatively, banks may opt for a safer lending policy. Reducing exposures to bad
borrowers and increasing exposures to good borrowers may support a macroeconomic
recovery.
Empirical literature provides some evidence that capital constraints may play a role in
reducing the availability of loans and that weakly capitalised banks sometimes
substitute away from high risk-weighted assets (see Jackson et al (1999) for an
overview
20). An analysis of the impact of the CRD on loan volumes, however,
requires an understanding of the link between banks’ capital management policy and
loan granting process.
Literature also points out that some of the loans that were cut cannot be substituted by
credit from other banking institutions or by external capital markets, at least not at the
same cost (e.g. loans to households, SMEs). Further, literature shows that credit
cycles may have an impact on  business cycles (see Berg et al (2005) for a general
discussion). Hence, an increase or a reduction in credit may have a good potential to
exacerbate macroeconomic fluctuations. It is unlikely that the CRD will have an
effect on firms’ funding options and on the link between the credit cycle and the
business cycle. Therefore, a framework to monitor CRD cyclicality could adopt these
two empirical findings as stylised facts.
20  Binding capital requirements seem to play in particular a role in the reduction of loans in ‘strong’
recessionary periods  (see e.g. Hancock and Wilcox (1997), Hancock and Wilcox (1998) , Peek and
Rosengren (1995) The size of the impact of binding capital requirements in ‘moderate’
recessionary periods is somewhat less clear cut  (e.g. Aikman and Vlieghe (2004)) have found that
the role of bank capital in propagating a recession may be rather small. A study by Zicchino and
Nier (2005) has shown that poorly capitalised banks extend fewer loans than their stronger
competitors.16
4. A possible framework for monitoring pro-cyclicality
The framework to monitor pro-cyclicality should be a dynamic one. At this juncture,
the CRD is still being implemented. The implementation date for the SA and the
FIRB approach is 1 January 2007. The most sophisticated approaches to credit risk
and operational risk will be available at the start of 2008. Banks adopting the CRD
will be required to calculate their capital requirements using the CRD and the present
framework in parallel for a period of 1 year.  Furthermore, banks will be subject to a
transition period during which limits
21 will be applied on the amount by which each
institution’s risk-based capital may decline in comparison with the requirements
stemming from the CRD. It is likely, however, that the CRD will not only change the
regulatory capital banks need to hold but also banks’ entire capital management
policy.
Possible follow-up work relating to a monitoring framework for pro-cyclicality
should tackle the following questions:
1. How will the CRD affect the cyclicality of the capital requirements?
Given that the CRD is still in the process of being implemented, very few data are
currently available. In the first years after implementation, the framework could be
limited to a descriptive analysis of available data and to a qualitative analysis. As
time passes and banks adapt to the CRD requirements, more data will become
available. As a result, more thorough econometric analysis will become possible.
Analysing potential pro-cyclicality in capital requirements requires data at the level
of individual banks (or alternatively data for different bank types which are more or
less prone to pro-cyclicality). However, it is important that the analysis take account
of the aggregate impact. Individual bank analysis related to pro-cyclicality may be
reasonable when seen from the perspective of individual agents, regardless of what
other banks do. The action of any individual bank, taken in isolation, would not be
such as to lead to a sufficient deterioration in the economic environment to make the
bank worse off. But if every bank does so, at some point there might be an effect on
the business cycle.
2. Are banks constrained by the CRD capital requirements? How will CRD affect
banks' capital management policy?
It has been argued that it may not matter that regulatory capital requirements fluctuate
more than before when large banks’ behaviour is driven by other capital
considerations. Follow-up work could address the following questions:
21  These limits will be implemented through capital floors, calculated as a function of the Basel I
requirements. These floors will in principle be abolished from 2010 onwards. However, for banks
that do not successfully complete the transition, supervisors have the possibility of continuing to
apply the capital floors or of introducing another, more appropriate floor.17
x What are the main characteristics of banks’ determination of the actual capital
they hold? What are the linkages and possible differences with the regulatory
capital requirement models?
x Is it banks’ regulatory capital (both Pillar I and Pillar II) which is the binding
constraint for banks (and under which conditions)?
x How important are other capital constraints (e.g. as set by rating agencies)?
x Will the CRD affect the likelihood that banks are confronted with binding
capital constraints and under which conditions? Will the CRD affect the role
of capital buffers for mitigating pro-cyclicality?
x Will the CRD affect the link between banks’ capital management policy and
loan granting process?
As pointed out before, this analysis is important because if the binding constraint for
banks is not regulatory capital, then any action to reduce the co-movement of the
CRD requirements with the economic cycle may not serve its purpose. A report
which analyses the cyclicality of regulatory capital requirements demands an
analysis of whether the possibly observed cyclicality also has an impact on bank
behaviour.
3  Interaction CRD and other sources of pro-cyclicality?
Example: What is the impact of CRT products and the capital requirements that
banks need hold for these on pro-cyclicality ?
Most studies that analyse the cyclicality of Basel II assume that banks are unable to
hedge their exposures and are unable to take on credit risk by selling credit
protection. Thereby they ignore the possible cyclical implications that could come
from the use of these CRT instruments. Some papers have analysed the relationship
between collateral and the business cycle, however it seems that no paper has
analysed the relationship between new CRT instruments and the business cycle.
Therefore, an analysis of the following questions seems relevant:
x What is the possible impact of new CRT products on the cyclicality of
lending?
x What is the impact of new CRT products on the cyclicality of capital
requirements?
x Are these new CRT instruments more important than more “traditional”
credit risk mitigation techniques (such as collateral and guarantees)?
Analysing the interaction between the CRD and other sources of pro-cyclicality is
important as an analysis on the pro-cyclicality of capital requirements should not be
performed in isolation. Different possible interacting sources of pro-cyclicality need
to be analysed. In particular, additional work might be required on those sources of
pro-cyclicality on which there is still insufficient knowledge such as the new CRT
products.18
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